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Abstract
The healthcare industry deals with highly sensitive data which must be man-
aged in a secure way. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) hold various kinds
of personal and sensitive data which contain names, addresses, social security
numbers, insurance numbers, and medical history. Such personal data is valu-
able to the patients, healthcare service providers, medical insurance companies,
and research institutions. However, the public release of this highly sensitive
personal data pose serious privacy and security threats to patients and health-
care service providers. Hence, we foresee the requirement of new technologies
to address the privacy and security challenges for personal data in healthcare
applications. Blockchain is one of the promising solutions, aimed to provide
transparency, security, and privacy using consensus-driven decentralized data
management on top of peer-to-peer distributed computing systems. Therefore,
to solve the mentioned problems in healthcare applications, in this paper, we
investigate the use of private blockchain technologies to asses their feasibility for
healthcare applications. We create testing scenarios using HyperLedger Fabric
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to explore different criteria and use-cases for healthcare applications. Addi-
tionally, we thoroughly evaluate the representative test case scenarios to assess
the blockchain-enabled security criteria in terms of data confidentiality, privacy
and access control. The experimental evaluation reveals the promising benefits
of private blockchain technologies in terms of security, regulation compliance,
compatibility, flexibility, and scalability.
Keywords: blockchain, electronic healthcare records, feasibility study,
healthcare, privacy, security, use-case
1. Introduction
In the healthcare sector such as medical institutions and insurance com-
panies, the infrastructure running healthcare applications and managing the
related data, deals with highly critical assets. These assets include Electronic
Health Records (EHRs) that hold various personal data such as names, ad-5
dresses, social security numbers, medical history, etc. which must never be
released to the public. However, such personal data has been the target of var-
ious cyber-attacks. To date, various medical institutions have been hacked and
millions of patients’ records have been stolen [1].
Several laws and regulations such as Health Insurance Portability and Ac-10
countability Act (HIPAA) [2] and the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) Act 2018 [3] have been put forth to provide guidelines to healthcare
applications on how personal data should be managed, processed, and secured
in order to avoid fraud and theft. Despite this, the healthcare industry still
seems to be an easy target for hackers and this is due to the lack of technolog-15
ical understanding within the industry. The recent attacks on the healthcare
industry are the evidence of data security challenges in this sector [1]. The tar-
get attacks include, but not limited to, phishing attacks and ransomware which
are successful in retrieving personal data. In fact, the high success rate of ran-
somware attacks has shown the lack of basic security measures such as backup20
and system updates (e.g., Wannacry attack) [4].
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Healthcare applications are very sensitive as they directly involve personal
and critical data, which must be secured from unauthorized access. According
to the GDPR regulation, medical data should be held by data controllers due to
the sensitive nature involved [3]. Currently, medical data is passed-on only to25
the concerned departments if consent is gained via proper channel (exceptions
are made for the prevention or control of pandemics and other serious threats
to health). Even though legislation is improving in term of data management;
however, medical records are still at risk due to security breaches. Personal data
has a high demand in the black market. According to a panel of experts at the30
digital health conference in 2011, a single EHR was valued at 50$ at the black
market which is extremely high in comparison to $0.25 for a credit card num-
ber [5]. One incident occurred at Howard University Hospital in 2012, where
the medical technician released the patients‘ names, addresses and medicare
numbers to black market, solely for financial gains. Other threats to health-35
care industry are caused by phishing attacks, where the hacker masquerades
as an authority to induce individuals to reveal personal data. These attacks
have high impacts as the revealed data can include patients’ information, or
employees’ distinct details including social security number, addresses, salaries
etc. For example, the attack on Magnolia Health Corporation (MHC), where40
the hacker was successful to obtain substantial information about employees us-
ing a spoofed email from the CEO. Another incident is the ransomware attack
on National Health Service (NHS) in 2017, where the hackers used malware to
encrypt NHS files [6], this attack resulted in the cancellation of over 6,900 NHS
appointments.45
The attacks targeting healthcare industry not only affect patients’ privacy
and security, but also cause financial and reputation damages. As these attacks
become more common and easy to perform, there is an urgent need for robust
and reliable ways to ensure data security, confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity to authorised users only. Various healthcare institutions have been looking50
into cloud-based technology and various kinds of encryption techniques. Re-
cently, blockchain technology has been used and acclaimed as one of the promis-
3
ing solutions to solve the security issues in healthcare applications. Blockchain
is based on a peer-to-peer distributed and decentralised computational archi-
tecture which puts emphasis on value and trust rather than the exchange of55
information [7, 8]. The incorporation of blockchain results in compliance with
the GDPR’s goal of protecting data by giving control to the users and using cryp-
tographic hashes and distributed consensus mechanisms to keep data integrity
and consistency. Many researchers and developers believe that blockchain is
the horizontal innovation needed to transform various industries. Even though60
blockchain has been heavily linked to the healthcare industry, there is a lack
of research into whether the existing blockchain technologies could be used for
the industry. The purpose of this study is to carry out an investigative analysis
of blockchain to find out whether it is a suitable technology for the healthcare
industry. To carry out the analysis, we check various scenarios to test healthcare65
application requirements.
The main contributions of this research paper are summarized:
1. Identification of the healthcare applications development requirements and
establishment of specific testing criteria;
2. Design and Implementation of scenarios on HyperLedger Fabric to assess70
the identified requirements and criteria;
3. Critical analysis of HyperLedger Fabric suitability for healthcare applica-
tion and highlighting the needed future development.
The rest of the paper is organised as follow: Section 2 presents the discussion
on the background and related works. Section 3 presents the detailed elaboration75
of our research methodology. Section 4 presents the design and implementation
details of use case scenarios. The results are presented in Section 5 and finally
the discussion and conclusion is presented in section 6.
2. Related work
In order to secure data and prevent attacks, various solutions have been80
proposed to tackle such security issues in the healthcare industry. For ex-
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ample, Yeng et .al [9] focused on encouraging a security conscious behaviour
in healthcare staff and provided a comprehensive Healthcare Security Practice
Analysis. The key Healthcare application architectures can be divided into two
categories: 1) cloud-based solutions, and 2) blockchain-based solutions. Indeed,85
various cloud-based architectures have been explored within healthcare industry,
specifically for managing EHRs and patient’s information [10]. Cloud comput-
ing can minimize the cost subsequently, thus, motivating to improve different
healthcare services [11]. For instance, prescription expenses can be reduced by
80% while utilizing cloud-based services [12]. Due to centralized and ubiquitous90
nature of the cloud computing architectures, it provides a great opportunity to
access data (patient or employee) anytime and anywhere. One such cloud-based
system is proposed by Koufi et al., which allows physicians to access patient’s
medical data at any given time [13].
On the other hand, blockchain has also been leveraged to address the issues95
faced by the healthcare industry. For example, applications such as BitHealth
and MedRec are notable Blockchain-based applications to support healthcare
industry [14, 15]. BitHealth uses bitcoin for storing and securing healthcare
data and focuses on privacy. Bitcoin is used for payments and for insurance
companies to retrieve medical history. However, it uses proof-of-work algorithm100
and depending on the size of the blockchain, it might be slow and energy ineffi-
cient. The other use-case, MedRed, is an EHR management system created by
MIT which focuses on improving tracking of these records [16]. Patients also
have some degree of control on their information and permissions are given to
the patients so they can decide whether to share data with professionals or not.105
MedRed is based on Ethereum, it uses the same algorithm for consensus (proof-
of-work) as bitcoin which is extremely costly and energy inefficient. Personal
data will be stored off-chain, so users cannot determine whether the records
are valid. Consequently, users’ authentication is legitimate, but the data may
not be accurate [17]. In [18], authors suggested Blockchain platform for effi-110
cient electronic medical record sharing while saving resources in blockchain and
considered different data format in medical records information.
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Several other research projects have also suggested the use of blockchain in
healthcare applications [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]; however, the evaluation of
the proposed schemes is still not clear in the existing works.115
Some studies have been conducted in order to fill this gap. We will compile
their findings as well as their shortcomings to identify how the evaluation process
of a blockchain application should be conducted.
There are different types of Blockchains, they could be classified in different
categories: public, private, hybrid and federated/consortium.120
Public Blockchains allow any user to join the blockchain (permission-less),
and do not discriminate between users [26]. On the other hand, private Blockchains
seem to be used more in the industry as there are more security and privacy con-
straints, and users need to request permission before becoming a member of the
blockchain (permissioned Blockchain). Members of a private blockchain can be125
further restricted with different access privileges. Unlike the private blockchain
which is managed by a single organisation, the consortium Blockchain is decen-
tralised and is managed by multiple organisations. It is also a hybrid Blockchain,
it can be used by banks and food tracking companies for example. Finally, hy-
brid Blockchain is based on a combination of private and public Blockchains130
features, where users control the access to their data and a subset of the data
can be put publicly available. The main advantage of a public blockchain is
its autonomy. All users have similar privileges, and no party can control the
stored data, which means that users do not have to trust and rely on a third
party. However, public Blockchains are extremely large and consume a large135
amount of energy as no user has access restrictions. On the other hand, private
Blockchains tend to be smaller and flexible as only limited number of users can
access the data from the blockchain, and they have different permissions and
access privileges.
In our point of view, the feasibility of blockchain itself is one of the first140
question that should be analysed carefully. In [27] for example, Lewis et al.
focus on identifying the key challenges that could be solved by Blockchain.
Authors claim that Blockchain is applicable to areas where trust, consensus,
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immutability or any mix of the 3 are the main challenges. This is a sensible
place to start the evaluation process of the feasibility of blockchain but seems to145
be optimistic and generic. Similarly, other researchers compiled a decision tree
to identify whether blockchain is necessary for a use-case [28, 29]. The common
drawback of these studies is that questions are often open-ended and are not
specific to certain applications or not built to solve specific challenges.
Table 1: Summary of evaluation metrics [30]
Metric Justification
1
Entire Workflow Must be
HIPAA Compliant






The blockchain-based healthcare app
should support Turing-complete
operations, i.e., it should contain






Two types of participants require
identification/ authentication in





Blockchain platform should enable the
exchange of clinical data and
interpretation of received data given the





The healthcare application may need to




Cost estimation is important when the
application provides services for large
number of participants. So Blockchain





Blockchain-based health systems should
grant patients easier access/control to
sharing their own medical data.
The studies are not specific to any industry and lack details for any industry150
to adopt the findings confidently. Zhang et al. conducted an evaluation specific
to the healthcare industry which will give insight into this study [30]. They
developed 7-layers guidelines that a blockchain healthcare application should
follow (table 1). A major criticism of this study is that it assumes already that
blockchain is applicable to the healthcare industry and fails to put any sort of155
weight or ranking on these guidelines [31].
In addition, researchers in [32] provided a statistical analysis of the effec-
tiveness of HyperLedger frameworks as a tool for developers to develop their
applications but was not focused on a specific application type. Similarly, Jianbi
et al. [33] proposed an automated testing of Blockchain-based decentralised ap-160
plications. Gencer et al. developed a project called ’Miniature World’ which
attempts to emulate a blockchain in a virtual environment and test it in differ-
ent scenarios. The testing was based on various metrics such as mining power,
fairness, consensus delay and time-to-win [34]. These studies were not specific
to healthcare applications and did not focus on its requirements and challenges.165
T.D. Smith et al. [14] suggested a Blockchain ’litmus test’ where the authors
surveyed blockchain applications (including MedRec) and concluded three cri-
teria that predict success for blockchain-based data management projects, i.e.,
dependability, security, and trust. While Gao et al. [35] conducted a sur-
vey on the applications using blockchain (e.g., healthcare applications, IoT and170
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cloud computing) and they assessed the primary challenges in the blockchain
implementations. Although their assessment focused only on security and per-
formance (availability and scalability) criteria, they concluded that blockchain
performance is going to be one of the biggest challenges for accessing medi-
cal data, especially in emergency situations. On the other hand, Kassab et al.175
[36] investigated in their survey the quality requirements for blockchain-based
healthcare systems and concluded that blockchain is likely to be a supplementary
technology and not a replacement of the healthcare system. Blockchain can be
used to handle a subset of data for specific procedures/type of data. Moreover,
Bodkhe et al. [37] proposed a survey on decentralized consensus mechanisms180
for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), where they considered the applicability of
consensus algorithms in IoT and other areas. While analysing IoT-based ap-
plications supported by blockchain such as smart-healthcare, they concluded
that there were many challenges related mainly to the conversion from cen-
tralised to decentralised system, cost, scale and associated overheads, network185
latency, throughput, and complex security mechanisms required to prevent dou-
ble spending attack [38]. On the other hand, some experts are very sceptical
about the adoption of blockchain in general. Zile et al. believe that blockchain
should not be used because decentralisation is costly and not necessary; cryp-
tocurrency is its only successful use-case for permission-less blockchain [39].190
Ultimately, there are inconsistencies and gaps in the evaluation methods put
forth but gives great insight into how to develop a framework for evaluation. By
consolidating all these various methods and relevant information, an effective
evaluation will be carried out to conclude whether blockchain should be used
in the healthcare system. In this study, we aim to provide an evaluation of195
scenarios related to key requirements of healthcare applications in a blockchain
environment. The following section will explain in detail the research method-
ology undertaken to achieve this aim.
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3. Research methodology
In this section, we elaborate on the Blockchain evaluation approach under-200
taken in this study. We start by identifying key requirements of healthcare
applications, and then we present the testing data in the form of scenarios
which are implemented to test the identified requirements. Finally, we present
the details of the tools used to develop the proposed blockchain environment. It
is important to note that the purpose of this paper is to perform essential tests205
that we consider critical before the development of the full application (the full
application is not developed in this context).
3.1. Requirements for the healthcare applications
Here, we outline the requirements of the proposed business network and
identify what must be done in order to accurately replicate the healthcare ap-210
plications. In order to investigate how blockchain can be leveraged, it must
solve the key issues related to security, regulation compliance, scalability, and
flexibility.
3.1.1. Security
The blockchain platform must ensure the basic aspects of security: availabil-215
ity, integrity and confidentiality, to be beneficial for the healthcare industry.
• Confidentiality can be achieved by making sure that the application is
on a private blockchain and have restricted access for users. This will
mimic the certification required in the healthcare industry, i.e., to become
a doctor, the right qualifications are needed. Similarly, in the business220
network, doctors’ accounts must be created by a medical institution. Fur-
ther to this, the blockchain network should be permissioned to preserve
data privacy. Furthermore, the participants will have different roles and
privileges. Additionally, encryption must be used to make sure that data
in-transit between the user and the blockchain is secure. Confidentiality is225
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also imperative in this business network because it directly combats phish-
ing attacks and data breaches (the most common attack on the healthcare
industry) [4, 1].
• Integrity: Integrity means to make sure that the information is trustwor-
thy and accurate. The blockchain must achieve this through two different230
ways: 1) hashing, and 2) shared distributed ledger. A strong collision-
resistant and secure hashing algorithm must be used to ensure integrity.
Similarly, confidentiality and access control also make sure that the data
is trustworthy by limiting the number of people who can tamper with the
information.235
• Availability: It is important that there is a reliable and easy access to
information on the blockchain. By ensuring that the blockchain network
is fault-tolerant, it reduces the number of failed connections to data on the
blockchain. Additionally, information on a blockchain is a shared ledger,
so there are various copies of the data making sure information will not240
disappear. The blockchain network must also run on the latest version of
HyperLedger to make sure any bugs do not affect the availability of the
system.
3.1.2. GDPR compliance
To test whether the healthcare industry can utilize blockchain; the business245
network must take steps to comply with the GDPR as much as possible. The
GDPR guarantees the following rights to data subjects [3, 40]:
• Transparency: Personal data should be processed lawfully and in a
transparent manner.
• Informed consent (collection purpose): Personal data should be col-250
lected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes. Data subjects re-
quire the ability to understand who and why people have access to their
data.
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• Right to object: The data subject can object to the processing of their
data, for example, for marketing or profiling purposes.255
• Right of access: Personal data should be securely stored and protected
against unlawful processing and accidental loss, destruction, or damage.
• Right to restrict access: Data subject may object to the processing of
their data (e.g in case of inaccuracy).
• Right of rectification: Personal data should be accurate and kept up260
to date. The data subjects should have the right to rectify inaccurate
personal data concerning them.
• Right of erasure (to be forgotten): The data subjects have the right
to request the erasure of personal data concerning them.
• Right of portability: The data subject has the right to obtain and re-265
use their data for their own purposes across different services (this assumes
the data must be in a common format).
The concepts that the healthcare industry could struggle with in the devel-
opment of Blockchain-based applications is the Right to be forgotten. However,
GDPR puts exemptions in relation to the public interest.270
3.1.3. Scalability
To be used within the industry, the blockchain must be able to manage
several participants with different roles and access privileges. As a result, the
application must be able to deal with scenarios with multiple participants who
all have different assets and data.275
3.1.4. Flexibility
The blockchain must be flexible enough to deal with different data types from
text to images. Medical practitioners do not only get information in the form of
text, but also in the form of images such as x-rays. Failing to introduce flexibility




Different tests were designed to assess the essential aspects of the Blockchain’s
network from security to fault tolerance. The tests have been derived from the
requirements and dictate whether the test was a success or a failure. Each test285
has objectives which outline the purpose of the test; a test description outlining
the methodology; an expected result and an actual result which shows the real
outcome of the test. For a test to pass, the expected result must be the same
as the actual result. All the tests were executed using HyperLedger Composer
and HyperLedger Fabric (detailed in section 4.2).290
This work solely used manual tests to focus on intricacies and details of the
blockchain. Manual tests are tests that are executed by an individual whereas
automated tests are executed via scripts. Automated tests are faster and seen
as more accurate but, in this project, manual tests were more appropriate. To
assess specific features such as participant’s access control, human intuition is295
imperative. Despite the increase in processing time, quick and reliable results
are given for anyone to interpret. Additionally, considering the flexibility of the
blockchain network, multiple scripts would need to be devised proving to be
time-consuming.
HyperLedger Composer offers 3 different types of tests for blockchain appli-300
cations: interactive test, automated unit tests and automated system tests. In
our work, we will be using interactive tests to assess whether the scenarios could
be implemented into blockchain. Interactive tests will be used to check valida-
tion, verification, permissions, and the overall performance of the blockchain
network. All the tests in the Table 2 will be used to evaluate the fault tolerance305
and efficiency of the business network.
Table 2: Additional tests
ID Test description
0 Only patients can create EHRs.
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Participant can not view or delete an EHR that does not belong to
them.
2 Only institutions can add practitioners to the business network.
3 Practitioners can only update EHRs they have been given access to.
4 Only the EHR owner can add/remove access rights from their EHR.
5 Only practitioners can record information about patient visits.
6 Only practitioners can refer patients to another practitioner.
7 Patients must be able to view when and why they have been referred.
8 Only the owner of the EHR can delete their EHR.
9 Image data (non-text) can be uploaded.
10 Only practitioners can upload images to EHRs
11
HTTPS must be used to secure the channel between the client and
blockchain.
3.3. Implementation tools and environment
3.3.1. Blockchain platform: HyperLedger Fabric
Several Blockchain platforms are available as open source to allow the de-
velopment of wide range of applications. Ethereum [41], HyperLedger Fabric310
(IBM) [42] and Corda R3 are the most used and developed platforms in the
literature nowadays [43].
A key requirement of the blockchain-based healthcare environment is to pro-
vide different levels of control to different types of users. This is only possible
with a permissioned frameworks like HyperLedger Fabric or Corda. Unlike315
Ethereum, Fabric and Corda provide more fine-grained access control, i.e., par-
ticipants can be restricted for read, create, update and delete rights and thus
have stronger privacy. Hence, the consensus in HyperLedger Fabric and Corda
can be achieved quickly as only parties taking part in a transaction need to reach
consensus. However, Ethereum Proof of Work (PoW) consensus mechanism is320
processor intensive and makes it impractical in the long run [44, 45, 43].
14
In addition, HyperLedger Fabric offers the delete rights for users. However,
no data is deleted, a delete is a transaction which simply marks certain data as
deleted. The number of blocks still increase with deleted transactions remaining
intact. Marking transactions as deleted is the only step taken by the Blockchain325
developers to comply with the GDPR. Even though this may not be enough to
comply with various legislations, it takes bigger steps than its peers. The right
to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten, is against the blockchain
principle of immutability, but it is worth investigating how blockchain-based
applications could comply with GDPR in this regard.330
Corda on the other hand is a platform specialized for the financial industry,
where the creation of digital currencies is not intended. According to Valenta
and Sandner [43], Corda’s focus on financial services transactions simplified its
architectural design compared to Fabric which provides an architecture to a
wide range of industries. There are recent efforts to integrate Corda into the335
HyperLedger framework. Therefore, Corda can be considered as a complement
to HyperLedger Fabric.
In this work, we used HyperLedger Fabric along with HyperLedger Composer
which is a development tool set to develop business networks. One of Fabric’s
main capabilities is the use of identity management. This functionality allows a340
developer to manage user authentication and authorisation. Another available
functionality is related to privacy and confidentiality services. Fabric achieves
this by using restricted messaging paths called private channels which provide
both confidentiality and privacy for transactions. Additionally, Fabric is atomic
and its smart contracts can fail in 2 separate ways:1) if there is an error during345
the execution of chain-code, the error will make the peer fail and the error is
returned; 2) If a transaction is endorsed but fails later, the transaction will be
rejected and logged as a failure.
Despite the benefit of Fabric cited above, there are few limitations such as
the lack of built-in consistency checks, which is left for the developer to enforce350
in the chain-code. Consistency ensures that operations always gets the latest
version of data. Further to this, Fabric’s transactions are 100% durable meaning
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that data will always be submitted even in case of system failure. In any case,
the transaction will be written to multiple nodes and as a result, it would not be
lost. Finally, we used HyperLedger Composer which is a development toolset355
to develop business networks. Composer has a user interface for configuring,
testing and deploying the business networks called Playground which is the main
tool used for implementation. Playground allows developers to simulate business
networks by utilising assets (goods or services that are stored in the blockchain);
participants (members of the blockchain) and transactions (methods allowing360
participants to interact with assets). The scenarios designed in this study are
simulated in Playground (as presented in Figs. 1, 2). Each scenario is designed
through the Define page (Fig. 3) and tested via the Test page (Fig. 4).
3.3.2. Implementation environment
We used a 64-bit Laptop with Ubuntu OS (version 20.04.1 LTS). Blockchain365
can rapidly scale from small to large but using the scenarios in Section 4.2 as
a blueprint, the machine specifications were enough. Larger scale blockchains
would require more processing power in order to be efficient and cope with
hundreds of active participants.
Before installing Fabric, the following prerequisites were required: git 2.9+;370
python 2.7.x; npm v5.x; Docker Engine 17.03+ and Docker-Compose 1.8+. To
create the development environment various components (known as CLI tools)
were required; the only compulsory component is composer-cli. However, in
order to enable features such as encryption, components such as composer-
rest-server are required. In order to develop and execute a business network,375
Composer Playground 0.19.20 and VSCode 1.51.1 were both installed. Us-
ing VSCodes marketplace the HyperLedger Composer extension was installed
to ease the development. Lastly, Fabric was installed from the github official
repository HyperLedger.github.io.
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Figure 1: Composer Playground
Figure 2: Playgrounds users
Figure 3: Playgrounds Define Page
Figure 4: Playgrounds Test Page
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Figure 5: Class Diagram
4. Design and Implementation380
The purpose of this design is to create a plan for a business network that
will be developed. In this section, we highlight how different segments of the
design interact with each other as well as display how scenarios will take place
within the business network.
The class diagram presented in Fig. 5 illustrates how different assets and385
participants will interact within the blockchain network. Relationships within
the systems display what transactions different participants can access as well
as the multiplicity between them. As this is a blockchain, all attributes are
private unless the correct permissions are given but the class diagram below is
an abstract overview of how the system will work. Further to this, Fig. 5 clearly390
expresses any needs and dependencies classes have, giving a deeper insight into
the blockchain’s structure.
4.1. Users and permissions
Each participant’s role and access control are charted in Table 3. These
permissions and roles will mirror some of the different roles used in the health-395
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care sector and will illustrate how a permissioned blockchain can be utilized in
different use cases.
Table 3: Participant’s permissions
Role Permissions
Admin Has full access to all users and system resources.
Member Create, delete, read and update their own participant information.
Medical
institution
Create, delete, read and update their own participants information.
Medical institutions such as hospitals must authorise/create doctors,
pharmacists, surgeons etc as medical practitioners, it can also view
their employees’ participant information.
Medical
practitioner
Create, delete, read and update their own participant information.
• Read/update permissioned EHR: If a patient has authorised a
practitioner, the latter is able to read or update the patient’s EHRs.
• Refer to other practitioners: Practitioners can grant update rights to
other practitioners on EHRs they have been authorised to update.
Patient
Create, delete, read, and update their own participant information.
• Grant update rights to practitioners: the patient can grant the doctor
the correct permissions to update their EHR.
• Remove permissions from practitioners: The patient can revoke rights
from a practitioner if they see fit.
Several transactions have been added to the developed platform in order to
simulate an application and test different access rights implemented (Fig. 6
and 7), for example a hospital account only can create practitioners’ (doctors)400
accounts as shown in Fig. 8.
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Figure 6: Create new Blockchain user
Figure 7: List of transactions
Figure 8: Hospital account only can create a practitioner
4.2. Scenario design
4.2.1. Basic scenario
This scenario tests different access control policies between a standard user
and specified member of the blockchain (patients, medical institutions or medi-405
cal practitioners). Specified members will be able to view data on the blockchain
whereas a standard user will have no access. Further to this, this scenario con-
firms the use of a strong hashing function and the concept of a shared ledger.
The patient and the medical practitioner should have a copy of the same trans-
action (Fig. 9). Participants are: User A, Patient A, and Doctor A. They will410
be added to the blockchain as non-admin members. The admin user will have
full read and write access to the blockchain. Patient A creates an EHR and lists
Doctor A as his/her doctor. Patient A and Doctor A will be able to access the
EHR created by the participant whereas User A should not be able to see the
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EHR or have any knowledge about anyone on the blockchain.415
Figure 9: Basic Scenario - UML Use Case Diagram
4.2.2. Permissioned scenario
This use case tests the level of permissions utilized on Fabric regarding cre-
ate, read, update, and delete operations. In this scenario, Medical institutions,
patients, and practitioner will all have different permissions corresponding to
Table 3. The goal of this scenario is to explore how Fabric permissions could be420
used to setup and manage authorisations and access control to different types
of participants (Fig. 10).
Figure 10: Permissioned Scenario - UML Use Case Diagram
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Figure 11: Purging Scenario - UML Use Case Diagram
4.2.3. Purging scenario
To be GDPR/HIPAA compliant, patients must have complete control over
their EHRs, this includes both giving patients the ability to remove read rights425
from reading the EHR and deleting the EHR. The GDPR states the user must
have the right to be forgotten. Consequently, this use case tests the removal
of patient data (Fig. 11). Patient As GP is currently GP A, patient A moves
and as a result GP refers patient A to GP B. To minimize the number of
people who have access to his/her EHR, Patient A revokes access from GP A.430
Additionally, patient B has heard of a recent security breach to EHRs and as a
countermeasure patient B deletes his/her EHR.
4.2.4. Data type scenario
Figure 12: Data Type Scenario - UML Use Case Diagram
This use case tests how Fabric interacts with different kinds of data. Within
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this scenario, the blockchain will have to cope with images and text to mimic the435
data used within the healthcare industry such as X-Rays and their annotations
(Fig. 12). patient A goes for an x-ray to specialist A and subsequently gives
specialist A rights to update his/her EHR. Unlike purging data scenario, a
reason explaining why specialist A was given rights will be included within the
transaction. This ensures patient A knows why participants have access to440
his/her data as well as who has access. Later, specialist A uploads an image to
an application which then converts the image to base 64. The image in base 64
is then uploaded to Fabric and stored for future referral and transformations.
4.2.5. Encryption scenario
This use case tests what cryptographic capabilities are available on Fabric.445
For example, to ensure that connection to the blockchain is secure and protected
from man-in-the-middle attacks, a level of security must be available (Fig. 13).
Figure 13: Encryption Scenario - UML Use Case Diagram
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5. Experimental Results
In this section, we discuss the results from the implemented scenarios in the
blockchain environment.450
5.1. Security
Throughout each scenario, validation has been made to increase the fault-
tolerance of the developed blockchain. Even though Fabric is described as fault-
tolerant; it does not enforce any fault-tolerance within chain-code leaving it up
to the developer. The Basic Scenario used access control to restrict resource455
utilization to named roles (patients, medical practitioners, and medical institu-
tions). This achieves a superficial level of confidentiality by keeping personal
data private to blockchain participants. Further to this, Basic Scenario show-
cases 2 key concepts of a blockchain: shared ledger and hashing which together
achieve an acceptable level of integrity. SHA-2 was used to hash each transac-460
tion ensuring users that the transaction is accurate. There is no known breach
to SHA-2 making it near impossible for a hacker to replace or create a transac-
tion that fits to the blockchain. The concept of shared ledger ensures that data
within the system is accurate and unaltered because all peers of the blockchain
have their own copy. Basic Scenario alone shows 2 key concepts which are465
enough to achieve integrity but leaves much to be desired in regards for confi-
dentiality. Permissioned Scenario scaffolds from Basic Scenario and implements
various access controls providing confidentiality between different participants
on the blockchain. By granting different permissions to different roles within
the blockchain, the number of users who have access to patients’ personal data470
is significantly reduced, which will reduce the risk of data breach. Figure 14
shows the doctor has no access to patients or their EHRs, when patients update
their EHR access rights and give the doctor access (Fig. 15 and 16), the doctor
can view the EHR and update it after each visit (Fig. 17). Note that in each
scenario we tested the user permissions, for example, patients can control who475
has access to their EHR but they cannot add visit details to their EHR (Fig.
18).
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Figure 14: Doctor has no access to EHRs Figure 15: Patient updates access to his EHR
Figure 16: Doctor has now access to EHR Figure 17: Doctor updates the EHR
With Encryption Scenario, confidentiality is fully achieved by protecting
data outside of the blockchain. Basic Scenario and permissioned scenario
achieved confidentiality on the blockchain but fail to protect any in-transit data.480
This scenario creates a bespoke REST API to encrypt and protect data being
25
Figure 18: Patients cannot add visits
transmitted between the client and the blockchain. Elliptic-Curve Diffie Hell-
man (ECDH) is used as the key exchange with the public-private key pair, and
AES128 is used as the symmetric encryption method.
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5.2. Regulation compliance485
Figure 19: Patient View EHRs
Figure 20: Patient removing Practitioner
(#0003) from their EHR
Figure 21: Patient transactions list
A part of this work was to assess whether HyperLedger could comply with
the GDPR [40] (rules detailed in section 3.1.2) which are tested in Basic scenario
and Permissioned scenario. Figure 19 shows that patients can view their data,
while Fig. 20 shows the ability for a patient to restrict/remove data access to
practitioner (Fig. 21 shows the list of successful transactions). In addition,490
in the permissioned scenario, patients can control how long practitioners have
access to their EHR (Right of erasure).
Although Blockchain does not allow removing data, or controlling how the
shared data will be processed, the introduction of different access control rules
grant patients the ability to control who has access to their EHRs, which comply495
with the GDPR right of access and right to restrict access. If the patients deny
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access to their EHR, they can at least ensure that no practitioner will have
access to their data which could be considered as data removal, as the data is
only available to the patient.
Figure 22: Doctor cannot delete patient’s EHR
Figure 23: Patient deleting their EHR
Unlike HIPAA, the GDPR states individuals have the right to erasure which500
Purging Data Scenario examines [46]. Composer allows participants to delete
their own data as shown in Fig. 23) (which is not allowed for other users - Fig.
22). Superficially, it seems that HyperLedger complies with the GDPR and can
delete data. However, Composer is simply a higher-level tool-set which runs on
top of Fabric. Transactions are simply marked as deleted and appear that way in505
Composer but at the Fabric level, the transaction remains unchanged. If Fabric
is the network level; Composer would be the application layer. To cooperate
with regulations, some blockchain application designers suggested HyperLedger-
built applications must not store any sensitive data and it is recommended that
all personal data should be stored in an off-chain database [47, 48, 49]. However,510
as we explained above, patients have access restriction control over their data,
deletion could be replaced by denying any access to their EHR data by any
other user.
HIPAA and the GDPR enforce consent through authorization and right to
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be informed respectively [46]. Though the GDPR takes it a step further and515
requires individuals to be notified if there are any changes regarding access or
purpose. Data type scenario demonstrates this right by recording the reason for
referral in each transaction. Patients can see why specific medical practitioners
access their EHR by checking their transaction list.
Although in this paper we focused on GDPR as a data privacy regulation,520
but there are many others around the world such as the Australia’s Privacy
Act 1988, Data Privacy act 2018, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA,
1st January 2020), and the Nevada privacy law (1st October 2019). They are
different but they all aim to achieve many of the same things, such as the right
to erasure and the right to access data.525
5.3. HyperLedger test analysis - scalability and flexibility
Our test results revealed that Fabric is not very flexible and expects certain
functionalities to be carried out on the application side. Fabric is designed
to deal with only text-based data, there is no innate support for images or
audio. Data type scenario shows that Fabric can cope with images but only530
with some outside interference. Within the scenario, a theoretical application
on top of the blockchain converts the image to base64 which can then be stored
on the blockchain. Fabric does not deal with data in any unique way and is
unaffected by base64. Alternatively, an image could be stored in a database
and the reference could be stored within Fabric but that adds another layer535
of complexity and security risks. Ultimately, storing images in base64 is not a
major issue for healthcare. Base64 does not reduce the quality that physicians
may need to see but simply changes the way the data is represented whilst
compressing data. Furthermore, Fabric does not require the capability to store
images or audio directly as they are not being treated any different within the540
blockchain (Fig. 25 shows the image details in the EHR after the transaction 24
was executed by the doctor).
Moreover, Fabric fails to solve the issue of limited computational resources.
As the system scales, so do the number of computation resources needed on
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Figure 24: Doctor adding X-ray Figure 25: Image stored in an EHR
each peer. For blockchain to be adopted by the healthcare industry, energy545
consumption and computational resources will have to be evaluated. It has
become standard for blockchain platforms to offer some sort of encryption, but
Fabric allows developers to use what encryption methods they see fit. This is
extremely beneficial within the industry as it allows hospitals to protect their
data with the latest forms of encryption rather than waiting for HyperLedger550
to release an update. Despite the flexible encryption, Fabric offers no chain-
code level encryption. It is obvious that Fabric expects all sensitive data to be
stored off-chain which is why it only offers encryption to in-transit data 1. This
feature of Fabric seems to be an answer to all the criticisms blockchain has been
getting regarding data immutability. If data is stored off-chain, then the data555
immutability of a blockchain becomes less of a significant problem.
5.4. Additional test results
Adopting blockchain within the industry would drastically increase trans-
parency and integrity. It would be extremely difficult to impersonate a patient
within the developed business network, further limiting the superficial cyber-560
1https://sxi.io/offchain-storage-in-hyperledger-fabric/
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attacks within the industry. Additionally, the encryption capabilities of TLS
could potentially protect the healthcare industry from more complex cyber-
attacks. As the industry continues to adopt more cloud applications, blockchain
will become more attractive. The DPA 2018, HIPAA, and GDPR are set out
to give more control to patients, but cloud solutions lack control as the ven-565
dor is responsible for infrastructure security and management. The permis-
sioned blockchain proposed in Permissioned Scenario grants patients control
with transparency which no other platform would be able to offer. 94% of the
additional test shown in Table 2 passed, showing multiple aspects of the business
network’s fault-tolerance. The blockchain was able to throw multiple custom-570
built errors to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data. Even though the
business network was not designed for commercial use, a rudimentary level of
fault tolerance was needed to showcase Fabric’s capabilities.
Test 10 failed when we tried referring one patient to a non-assigned id. The
test failed due to the incompatibility of the permissions designed (Section575
4.1). The business network was permissioned in a way where practitioners had
no knowledge of patients unless a relationship was formed. Consequently, throw-
ing an error would alert medical professionals to what IDs exist and compromise
confidentiality. Confidentiality prioritised fault-tolerance as a requirement and
was kept within the business network. This test result shows us that not all580
access control mechanism should be implemented on the blockchain but should
be used in conjunction with client-side applications’ access control. Ultimately,
there seems to be a minuscule trade-off between fault-tolerance and confiden-
tiality.
5.5. Summary of test results585
We have assessed different elements and capabilities in the previous tests
through different scenarios. Our goal is not to create a complete application
but to test the different Blockchain capabilities before the application design.
It was demonstrated that Fabric is a shared ledger with different users per-
missions, but to further increase confidentiality, transactions are hidden at the590
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composer level if the transaction does not affect the participant. In addition, as
patients can control access to their EHR (Give access to a practitioner, define
how long the access can last for and deny the access), we can assume the Fab-
ric comply with the key GDPR requirements: right of access, right to restrict
access and the right of erasure (personal data should not be kept longer than595
someone needs it).
Finally, we have tested the different data types that could be stored in the
HyperLedger Fabric which does not accept any other form of data but text,
it is easy to implement an application layer that will convert any data in to
text (converting Base64 does not reduce the quality of the image). Fabric’s600
reluctance to support non-text-based data reinforces the notion that Fabric
wants data to be stored in an external database, which has been supported by
other researchers [47, 48, 49], although we believe that this will add another
layer of complexity and security risks. Overall, Fabric allows different ways
and flexibility in term of application design and development. For example,605
we have seen that the developers can decide what encryption methods to use.
However, all those points must be acknowledged and taken into account in the
development of the application layer or the client side application.
The testing data is in form of several files (configuration and scenarios), and
is made available in a public github repository:610
https://github.com/asmaadnane/Blockchain-healthcare
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Throughout this work, multiple problems have been identified within health-
care sector where blockchain is proposed as a solution to secure EHR. The
healthcare industry has been identified as an ‘easy’ target for cyber-attacks but615
does blockchain reduce the security risks? As shown in the results, blockchain
offers authenticity making it near impervious to impersonation attacks. Further
to this, the encryption capabilities displayed by blockchain makes it safe from
man-in-the-middle attacks. Most importantly, the access control of blockchain
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restricts the number of people who can view EHR data. As a result, data620
breaches are less likely to occur.
Does this mean that blockchain solves healthcare security threat? If sensitive
data is stored on the blockchain, the security benefits solve both the high and
low-level cyberattacks. However, it has been shown that Fabric developers are
suggesting data storage. A blockchain in this form only protects reference data;625
reducing blockchain to a lookup table which does not provide any security on
actual personal data. Sensitive data must be stored on the blockchain to benefit
the healthcare industry resulting in applications taking more responsibility. The
application must convert all data to text; provide script-level encryption and a
degree of access control to accommodate for blockchain’s weaknesses.630
Unlike blockchain, the cloud offers ubiquitous resources and is optimised for
IoT. Despite this, blockchain still provides a better platform for healthcare as
security is a necessity rather than an ideal function. It is essential that the scale
of any blockchain application must be managed; blockchain, in its current iter-
ation, exponentially requires more resources as the size increases. Even though,635
many of the security features implemented are not exclusive to blockchain. Se-
curity is the responsibility of the vendor, allowing for less flexibility within the
industry. Blockchain allows developers to easily design their security functions
such as changing the encryption algorithms, which is not the case for cloud
computing.640
If blockchain technology was to be developed for healthcare, there is a trade-
off between transparency and confidentiality that the industry should be aware
of. Blockchain is intended to increase trust by sharing all data. Yet, access
control offers limits to data sharing and achieves a level of confidentiality. Any
platform implementation must ensure that the access control is restricted only645
to identifiable data and still allows a level of transparency on the blockchain for
other data types/categories
Blockchain is not often considered when discussing regulation compliance
but in this paper, we highlighted various areas where Fabric platform complies
with the regulations. The biggest issue hindering in GDPR compliance is the650
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inability to remove data; however, we believe that this might not be an issue
in the case of healthcare applications where EHRs do not need to be deleted.
Instead, Blockchain platforms, such as Fabric, gives a complete autonomy to
the patients, so that they have full control over their EHR and they can decide
who can access their health record and for what purpose.655
As countries become more aware of the energy consumption of existing
Blockchains, the chance of legislation changing to accommodate the emergence
of blockchain is extremely slim. The trade-off between computational overhead
and security cannot be made if blockchain stores sensitive data. Ultimately,
Fabric provides security benefits to the healthcare industry and would reduce660
the number of cyberattacks. Yet other blockchain platforms in their current
iteration are not suitable for healthcare. Although certain research suggested
using a blockchain with a relational database to store the data, this could create
new risks to personal/critical data security and privacy directly.
Blockchain presents significant security benefits but it suffers with an even665
larger trade-off in the form of overheads and regulation compliance. Legisla-
tion takes a significant amount of time to adapt to technology; the data pro-
tection act stayed the same between 1997 when it was first proposed to 2018
when it was updated. Alternative technologies, such as cloud computing can
completely comply with the GDPR as well as offering a surplus of resources670
cheaply. Whereas the implementation of certain blockchain applications strug-
gles to comply with the GDPR and requires a large number of resources as the
system scales. However, blockchain is only in its 2nd generation with bitcoin
being the first generation. As more time and finance is invested into blockchain,
it may become viable to not only healthcare but multiple different industries.675
According to the recent Hyperledge announcement 2, Hyperledge seems to have
a stable future. Indeed, there are 23 Hyperledger Certified Service Providers




Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States. Further, several com-
panies on the recent Forbes Blockchain 50 list named at least one Hyperledger680
technology as part of their solution platform.
Finally, our work is the first to study preliminary healthcare applications
constraints and how they could be implemented in blockchain platform such
as Fabric. The focus was on the healthcare applications characteristics rather
than the large set of options and capabilities offered by any blockchain plat-685
forms. This evaluation study contributed in defining the key criteria for the
implementation of secure blockchain-based healthcare applications. Although
we have not evaluated the performance parameters and the tests have been
made in Fabric only, similar evaluation can be made on other platforms, or
other criteria such as the performance could be evaluated. It is important to690
point out that the evaluation should be based on the applications constraints
and needs, as well as which blockchain platform will be the best to answer those
constraints and needs while ensuring good performances and data security.
For future work, we plan to use HyperLedger Explorer tool to help explore
consensus, peers, blocks, and energy consumption. Using explorer in conjunc-695
tion with a developed blockchain would only provide further details into how
blockchain could be utilized within the healthcare industry. Finally, blockchain
performance will be evaluated under a different set of Healthcare applications’
requirements.
References700
[1] S. Argaw, N. Bempong, B. Eshaya-Chauvin, A. Flahault, The state of re-
search on cyberattacks against hospitals and available best practice recom-
mendations: a scoping review, in: BMC Medical Informatics and Decision
Making, Vol. 19, 2019.
[2] Health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996, 104th Congress705
Public Law 104191.
35
[3] Council of European Union, 2018 reform of eu data protection rules, Eu-
ropean Commission.
[4] A. Le-Bris, W. El-Asri, State of cybersecurity & cyber threats in healthcare
organizations (2017).710
[5] L. Adefala, Healthcare experiences twice the number of cyber attacks as
other industries, Fortinet (March 2018).
URL www.csoonline.com/article/3260191/healthcare-experiences-
twice-the-number-of-cyber-attacks-as-other-industries.html
[6] D. Gayle, A. Topping, I. Sample, S. Marsh, V. Dodd, NHS Seeks to Recover715
from Global Cyber-Attack as Security Concerns Resurface, in: Guardian
News and Media, 2017.
[7] M. S. Ali, M. Vecchio, M. Pincheira, K. Dolui, F. Antonelli, M. H. Rehmani,
Applications of Blockchains in the Internet of Things: A Comprehensive
Survey, IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials 21 (2) (2019) 1676–1717.720
[8] F. Ahmad, Z. Ahmad, C. A. Kerrache, F. Kurugollu, A. Adnane, E. Barka,
Blockchain in Internet-of-Things: Architecture, Applications and Research
Directions, in: International Conference on Computer and Information Sci-
ences (ICCIS), 2019, pp. 1–6.
[9] P. K. Yeng, B. Yang, E. A. Snekkenes, Framework for healthcare security725
practice analysis, modeling and incentivization, in: 2019 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Big Data (Big Data), 2019, pp. 3242–3251.
[10] E. Markakis, Y. Nikoloudakis, E. Pallis, M. Manso, Security assessment
as a service cross-layered system for the adoption of digital, personalised
and trusted healthcare, in: IEEE 5th World Forum on Internet of Things730
(WF-IoT), 2019, pp. 91–94.
[11] H. Abrar, S. J. Hussain, J. Chaudhry, K. Saleem, M. A. Orgun, J. Al-
Muhtadi, C. Valli, Risk analysis of cloud sourcing in healthcare and public
health industry, IEEE Access 6 (2018) 19140–19150.
36
[12] O. Ali, A. Shrestha, J. Soar, S. F. Wamba, Cloud Computing-enabled735
Healthcare Opportunities, Issues, and Applications: A Systematic Re-
view, International Journal of Information Management 43 (2018) 146–158,
doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2018.07.009.
[13] V. Koufi, F. Malamateniou, G. Vassilacopoulos, Ubiquitous Access to
Cloud Emergency Medical Services, in: 10th IEEE International Confer-740
ence on Information Technology and Applications in Biomedicine, 2010,
pp. 1–4.
[14] T. D. Smith, The blockchain Litmus Test, in: IEEE International Confer-
ence on Big Data (Big Data), 2017, pp. 2299–2308.
[15] J. Cordwell, Blockchain in Healthcare: From Theory745
to Reality, in: DXC.Technology, 2015, available online:
https://blogs.dxc.technology/2015/10/30/blockchain-in-healthcare-from-
theory-to-reality/ (Accessed: 9th January, 2020).
[16] N. Nchinda, A. Cameron, K. Retzepi, A. Lippman, Medrec: A network
for personal information distribution, in: 2019 International Conference on750
Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), 2019, pp. 637–641.
[17] A. R. Lee, M. G. Kim, I. K. Kim, Sharechain: Healthcare data sharing
framework using blockchain-registry and fhir, in: 2019 IEEE International
Conference on Bioinformatics and Biomedicine (BIBM), 2019.
[18] S. Wu, J. Du, Electronic medical record security sharing model based755
on blockchain, in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on
Cryptography, Security and Privacy, ICCSP 19, Association for Com-
puting Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2019, p. 1317. doi:10.1145/
3309074.3309079.
[19] S. Wang, J. Wang, X. Wang, T. Qiu, Y. Yuan, L. Ouyang, Y. Guo, F. Wang,760
Blockchain-powered parallel healthcare systems based on the acp approach,
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems 5 (4) (2018) 942–950.
37
[20] J. Qiu, X. Liang, S. Shetty, D. Bowden, Towards secure and smart health-
care in smart cities using blockchain, in: 2018 IEEE International Smart
Cities Conference (ISC2), 2018, pp. 1–4.765
[21] K. M. Hossein, M. E. Esmaeili, T. Dargahi, A. khonsari, Blockchain-based
privacy-preserving healthcare architecture, in: 2019 IEEE Canadian Con-
ference of Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE), 2019, pp. 1–4.
[22] T. K. Dasaklis, F. Casino, C. Patsakis, Blockchain meets smart health: To-
wards next generation healthcare services, in: 9th International Conference770
on Information, Intelligence, Systems and Applications, 2018, pp. 1–8.
[23] P. Ndayizigamiye, S. Dube, Potential adoption of blockchain technology
to enhance transparency and accountability in the public healthcare sys-
tem in south africa, in: 2019 International Multidisciplinary Information
Technology and Engineering Conference (IMITEC), 2019, pp. 1–5.775
[24] R. Gupta, S. Tanwar, S. Tyagi, N. Kumar, M. S. Obaidat, B. Sadoun,
Habits: Blockchain-based telesurgery framework for healthcare 4.0, in:
2019 International Conference on Computer, Information and Telecommu-
nication Systems (CITS), 2019, pp. 1–5.
[25] J. Hathaliya, P. Sharma, S. Tanwar, R. Gupta, Blockchain-based remote780
patient monitoring in healthcare 4.0, in: 2019 IEEE 9th International Con-
ference on Advanced Computing (IACC), 2019, pp. 87–91.
[26] D. Appelbaum, S. S. Smith, Blockchain Basics and Hands-on Guidance:
Taking the Next Step toward Implementation and Adoption, CPA, 2018.
[27] R. Lewis, 30 things you can do with a blockchain, [online]785
https://medium.com/@rhian is/30-things-you-can-do-with-a-blockchain-
85ca9f094a18 [Accessed July 2020].
[28] S. K. Lo, X. Xu, Y. K. Chiam, Q. Lu, Evaluating suitability of apply-
ing blockchain, in: 2017 22nd International Conference on Engineering of
Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS), 2017, pp. 158–161.790
38
[29] M. E. Peck, Blockchain World - Do You Need a Blockchain? This Chart
Will Tell You If the Technology Can Solve Your Problem, IEEE Spectrum
54 (10) (2017) 38–60, doi:10.1109/MSPEC.2017.8048838.
[30] P. Zhang, M. A. Walker, J. White, D. C. Schmidt, G. Lenz, Metrics for
assessing blockchain-based healthcare decentralized apps, in: 2017 IEEE795
19th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and
Services (Healthcom), 2017, pp. 1–4.
[31] T. T. A. Dinh, R. Liu, M. Zhang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi, J. Wang, Untangling
blockchain: A data processing view of blockchain systems, IEEE Transac-
tions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 30 (7) (2018) 1366–1385.800
[32] T. Q. Ban, B. N. Anh, N. T. Son, T. Van Dinh, Survey of hyperledger
blockchain frameworks: Case study in fpt universitys cryptocurrency wal-
lets, in: Proceedings of the 2019 8th International Conference on Software
and Computer Applications, ICSCA 19, Association for Computing Ma-
chinery, New York, NY, USA, 2019, p. 472480.805
[33] J. Gao, H. Liu, Y. Li, C. Liu, Z. Yang, Q. Li, Z. Guan, Z. Chen, Towards
automated testing of blockchain-based decentralized applications, in: Pro-
ceedings of the 27th International Conference on Program Comprehension,
ICPC 19, IEEE Press, 2019, p. 294299. doi:10.1109/ICPC.2019.00048.
URL https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPC.2019.00048810
[34] A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, Miniature world: Mea-
suring and evaluating blockchains (2017), [July 2020]
https://hackingdistributed.com/2017/02/10/miniature-world/.
[35] W. Gao, W. G. Hatcher, W. Yu, A survey of blockchain: Techniques,
applications, and challenges, in: 2018 27th International Conference on815
Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), 2018, pp. 1–11.
[36] M. Kassab, J. DeFranco, T. Malas, G. Destefanis, V. V. Graciano Neto,
Investigating quality requirements for blockchain-based healthcare systems,
39
in: 2019 IEEE/ACM 2nd International Workshop on Emerging Trends in
Software Engineering for Blockchain (WETSEB), 2019, pp. 52–55.820
[37] U. Bodkhe, D. Mehta, S. Tanwar, P. Bhattacharya, P. K. Singh, W. Hong,
A survey on decentralized consensus mechanisms for cyber physical sys-
tems, IEEE Access 8 (2020) 54371–54401.
[38] C. Natoli, V. Gramoli, The blockchain anomaly, in: 2016 IEEE 15th In-
ternational Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA),825
2016, pp. 310–317.
[39] K. Zile, R. Strazdina, Blockchain Use Cases and Their Feasibility, Applied
Computer Systems 23 (1) (2018) 12–20.
[40] P. Voigt, A. v. d. Bussche, The EU General Data Protection Regulation:
A Practical Guide, Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2017.830
[41] V. Buterin, Ethereum whitepaper (2013).
[42] C. Cachin, Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric (2020).
[43] M. Valenta, P. Sandner, Comparison of ethereum, hyperledger fabric and
corda, in: F. S. of Finance & Management gGmbH (Ed.), Frankfurt School
Blockchain Center www.fs-blockchain.de.835
[44] X. Xu, I. Weber, M. Staples, L. Zhu, J. Bosch, L. Bass, C. Pautasso,
P. Rimba, A taxonomy of blockchain-based systems for architecture design,
in: IEEE Conference on Software Architecture, 2017, pp. 243–252.
[45] P. Sajana, M. Sindhu, M. Sethumadhavan, On blockchain applications: Hy-
perledger fabric and ethereum, International Journal of Pure and Applied840
Mathematics 118 (18) (2018) 2965–2970.
[46] S. A. Tovino, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and the EU GDPR: Illustrative
Comparisons, Seton Hall law review 47 4 (2017) 973–93.
40
[47] Q. Lu, X. Xu, Adaptable blockchain-based systems: A case study for prod-
uct traceability, IEEE Software 34 (6) (2017) 21–27.845
[48] H. T. Vo, A. Kundu, M. K. Mohania, Research directions in blockchain
data management and analytics, Proc. EDBT (2018) 445–448.
[49] T. Hepp, M. Sharinghousen, P. Ehret, A. Schoenhals, B. Gipp, On-chain
vs. off-chain storage for supply- and blockchain integration, Information
Technology 60 (5-6).850
41
